According to García Landa, communication succeeds if the interlocutor's representation of the meaning meant by a speaker matches that of the speaker himself. In this light, translation is seen as the (re-)production of such representations across the language barrier. Yet, in order to optimise -rather than 
I. Introduction
What follows is an overview of the general theory of interlingual mediation that I propound and explain in Viaggio (2006) . The basic theoretical questions concern the delimitation and definition of a theory's object. In our case: What is translation? What is the sufficient/necessary relationship between two texts or utterances that we may call one the translation of the other? What, in short, is a translator to do in order for a translation to exist? Whatever our answers to these questions, they are bound to prove wanting in one crucial respect: We, translators (including interpreters), although mostly engaged in "translation," do things other than "translating." What is it that we do that we may call it by one name? What is the Searlean "constitutive rule" of whatever it is (good) translators and interpreters do always, in writing or orally, semantically or communicatively, documentarily or instrumentally, literally or freely, literarily or 2 pragmatically, visibly or invisibly, overtly or covertly? It is an age-old question that has received different answers, but, to date, none of them has been wholly satisfactory. The problem lies in that, regardless of the explicit or implicit definition -i.e. of the theorygoverning the activity of translators across the centuries, and especially now that translation has become directly linked to the development of the productive forces of society, translators have had to do myriad things that have escaped any definition. One fact is, however, certain: translation is a form of communication between human beings, and not simply an operation between languages -or between oral or written texts. It is this perspective that spurs the best modern approaches (Nida (1964) , Seleskovitch and Lederer (1989) , Lvovskaja (1985 and , Reiss and Vermeer (1996) , Gutt (2001 ), García Landa (2001 , and Osimo (2001 and 2002) ).
II. Mariano García Landa: speech and translation as perceptual processes
García Landa is the first one to understand speech as the production of second-degree (i.e. social, non-natural) percepts whose object is sense -that which a speaker means to say. Such percepts are produced in specific acts of speech by specific human beings on specific human beings in specific social and historical situations. The central idea is that outside the specific speech act sense does not exist. Sense is not in the signs. It is the product of a nonce social perception produced in a specific social situation: Outside such nonce and fleeting acts of comprehension -including self-comprehension-there is no sense. Sense is as much on a piece of paper (or in the hard disc inside a computer) as Kevin Kostner is inside the TV set. It is the perceiving subject who interprets those signs or points of light in just three colours respectively as meaning meant or a facethe difference being that one perception is social, second-degree, and the other, firstdegree, natural. What a speaker physically does, as a matter of fact, is produce differences in air pressure or doodlings 1 : this is what an interlocutor perceives through his senses. Except that what a speaker wishes to produce is not differences in air pressure (let alone doodlings), nor is it they that an interlocutor understands. There is a decisive ontological distinction between the perception of the social, intentional object, and that of the acoustic chains (or the graphic representation thereof) which such 3 percept is turned into or whence it derives. The object of a social perception is, always, an intention.
Intended sense comes to the speaker's awareness as a fleeting amalgam of ideational content and verbal form that is endowed with a certain emotive relief. This perception of one's own intended sense is the product of the concomitant activations of one's encyclopaedic and linguistic knowledge. In order to make manifest this percept, the speaker verbalizes his intended sense by means of a linguistic chain that must become sensorially perceptible as noise (or visual or tactile images), i.e. that must be turned into a natural, first-degree stimulus producing another natural, first-degree perception. At the other end of the act of communication, the interlocutor projects on the acoustic stimulus he has perceived his knowledge of the sign systems (the sedimentation of the countless acts of speech in which he has participated) and of the world 2 , and associates those differences in air pressure with linguistic signs, so that he too can perceive a linguistic chain. This chain is analyzed in a vast mental laboratory in which all the other stimuli accompanying the speech perception proper enter into play together with a complex array of knowledge and experience. The end product of this process is a new seconddegree, speech percept -sense as comprehended. Communication will have succeeded in so far as the object perceived by the speaker as his own meaning meant is the same now perceived by the interlocutor as meaning understood, i.e. insofar as there obtain between them a relation of identity. Such identity is not to be understood in the mathematical sense but as the relation established, as in natural perception, between a percept and its object (the term has caused a bit of an uproar; the reader may just substitute it mentally by "sameness").
III. There is more to meaning than ideational content
So far -García Landa. Indeed, the fact that ideational content can be reverbalized without much ado is essential for translation. Indeed, the translation of pragmatic texts is mostly a matter of reproducing ideational content. This is what Reiss and Vermeer (1991) imply when they speak of a text as an information offer. And that is why it is almost universally recognized that they are "easier" to translate than literary texts, 4 especially than the most formally marked specimens of lyric poetry, in which ideational content may lose most of its relevance. The problem is that there are many other layers of meaning that travel between speaker and interlocutor, even though they are not part of speech comprehension proper and, mostly, ensue from ideational comprehension.
One of them is, perhaps, the emotive relief of what García Landa calls the "noetic (i.e. 
V. Translation and mediation
If translation proper is -borrowing Wittgenstein's notion-a language game consisting in re-saying in a second act of speech in another language that which has been said in a previous act of speech in a given language -i.e., re-producing the same meaningmediation, as I understand it, is a larger game, consisting mostly and mainly, but not necessarily, of translating. Mediation -which need not be interlingual at all-has, indeed, as its primary task to help convey meaning by producing ideational identity and/or pragmatic correspondence (but not necessarily both) in different subjects in different situations, but always as a means to a further end: Achieving metacommunicatively relevant communication, which more often than not entails partial or even total manipulation of meaning. In view of the inescapable asymmetry between the ability, motivations, intentions and interests of any pair of interlocutors, these metacommunicative purposes can vary radically from the first speech act to the second. is no one in the middle to help us achieve what we cannot achieve on our own. As initiator of this act of speech, for instance, I assume full responsibility for what I want to 8 say or hide, and how and when to say it. And you, as a reader, assume full responsibility for cooperating with me. Our success is in nobody's hands but our own.
But the moment responsibility for your understanding me relevantly is not yours alone but a professional mediator's, and the moment making myself relevantly understood by you is no longer my exclusive responsibility but also that of a professional mediator, then you and I are both entitled to demand of him his best professional effort. We are entitled to expect that he understand the reasons behind my initiating this speech act (and not only what I am officially trying to say in it) better than you -and maybe even than I, and that he communicate more effectively than I -even if the specific rule of the specific game is to convey nothing but meaning as officially meant (which happens only in the most rarefied, severely institutionalized social settings). And it is also his responsibility to understand the reasons why you choose to participate in this speech act better than I -or maybe than you yourself. That is what turns a "mere" translator into a fully-fledged mediator: his ability to understand beyond meanings officially meant (regardless of what he actually does with that understanding).
A general theory of mediation of necessity must explain that the role of the mediator is, precisely, modulating -or, if you prefer, manipulating-meanings as officially meant so as to help communication overcome all manner of hermeneutic and pragmatic barriers in order to serve its metacommunicative purpose. For that very reason, a general theory of interlingual mediation cannot limit itself to explaining the reproduction and comprehension of meaning as officially meant -it must take a decisive step further and speak of the re-induction of metarepresented meaning within the larger framework of relevance theory and make room for all the adjustments that meta-communicatively successful communication entails.
VI. The overall importance of qualitative effects
The basic limitation of relevance theory in its original formulation (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995) , I submit, is that it takes contextual effects to be merely cognitive, i.e. And with it, a definition of translation that is both theoretically and practically apt. If we limit ourselves to looking at translation as a relationship between oral or written texts, or as a text-production and comprehension activity (which it is also), we are leaving out both main pillars supporting speech communication: The minds of the parties to the act of communication and, more specifically, the historically and situationally conditioned intention to do by saying and the historically and situationally conditioned intention to do by understanding that gives rise to it in the first place. Reiss and Vermeer and other functionalists, though without disregarding them, fail to incorporate explicitly these two extremes that precede and follow speech production and comprehension. This, I think, prevents them from producing a definition that is at the same time sufficiently precise and general. As they stand, functionalist approaches show themselves incapable of distinguishing translation from all other forms of interlingual mediation. This is, I
believe, their theoretical Achilles' heel. To sum up, then, the approaches by Nida, Gutt, Lvovskaya, the Parisians and García Landa (to translate is to reproduce sense/propositional content) are too restrictive, while that of Reiss and Vermeer (to translate is to offer an information offer about another information offer) -too wide, and Osimo's (to translate is to produce a "mental metatext" out of a "mental prototext")
-too vague to define with sufficient generality and precision not so much what is to "translate," but what translators are called upon to do as professional interlingual mediators.
VIII. The object of speech perception
What is, then, the object of a speech perception understood as a complex perceptual space? By automatically applying your hermeneutic package on the basis of the principles of relevance you perceive a communicative intention behind the signs you are processing. You may like or dislike the message, and maybe the message you get is not the one I wished to convey to you, but you (think that you) know that these letters, 
X. The status of formal equivalence
Whatever they may mean as specimens of a given language, then, whatever the semantic representation they may give rise to, those words that the interlocutor makes out on the basis of the contrasts on the page or the noises on the tape are nothing but the circumstantial evidence of the speaker's or writer's direct intended sense (what he means to say "officially", as opposed to indirect intended sense, for instance, allegorical). All too often, as I mentioned, the explicit or implicit assumption is that if those and no other are the words the speaker chose, he did it for a relevant reason utterances. Regardless of its empirical verifiability, it can still be asserted that in order for mediation to have succeeded, the mediator must have managed relevantly to convey the meaning as originally meant so that it will be relevantly understood by his interlocutor(s) -i.e. to help achieve between specific human beings in a specific social situation metacommunicatively relevant identity, i.e. sameness of ideational meaning plus an adequate correlation between intended and achieved contextual effects. Most exegetic, aesthetic and evaluative discussions will centre, precisely, on whether either of these two conditions has been met.
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XI. Relevant identity -translation as mediation
In its prototypical, ideal sense, translation is, thus, but the initiation of a second speech act in order to produce the same ideational meaning: A translator would ideally strive to -and succeed at-producing a second perception of meaning as officially meant. This, however, is seldom possible, necessary or advisable. The differences in time and place, personal and historic experience, knowledge and culture, ability, interests and sensitivity, and, generally, in all manner of pre-comprehension schemes and passing theories -i.e. in the hermeneutic and emotive package, combined with perceived relevance-mean that any new groups of interlocutors will approach any oral or written utterance -whether original or translated-with different expectations, ability and willingness to understand (which, again, is the reason behind the many "updates" of certain texts for new generations of readers).
Let us also remember that speech comprehension and the qualitative or cognitive effects of such comprehension are different things, as are immediate, spontaneous speech comprehension and the different metarepresentations it may give rise to: In principle, direct intended sense comprehension is always possible, but the metarepresentations based upon it and the effects both of speech comprehension and of the metarepresentations it gives rise to tend to vary enormously. The confusion of these ontologically different processes has led to no mean amount of confusion among translation scholars and practitioners. Once the inevitable and often crucial "side effects" of spontaneous speech comprehension are brought into the picture, once we take stock of the inescapable asymmetry between, on he one hand, ability and meaning to mean and, on the other, ability and disposition to understand, then translation is more relevantly seen not as an end in itself, but as the main tool of interlingual mediation, whose purpose is to achieve metacommunicatively relevant identity of meaning across the language barrier.
In actual practice, translation is always mediation and it is, therefore, more practical to equate them, which is what most modern approaches do, since it is what all professional translators must do all the time, whatever their conscious or unconscious theoretical outlook: A translator who can only "translate" will end up starving or living out of something else.
14 I have defined relevant identity as the symbiosis of a) the necessary degree of sameness between ideational meaning originally meant and finally understood, and b)
an adequate correlation between the mediator's intentions and the contextual effects of comprehension on his interlocutors -between different, not necessarily overlapping metarepresentations based on the perception of the same object, which in our case is always the same social object: meaning meant. Different "texts" being different objects, it stands to reason that there can be no identity at that level: readers of a translation perceive the same social object, meaning meant, in different formal guises. The relationship obtaining between these different forms, as different tokens of the same type, is no longer of identity but of equivalence, similarity, analogy or whatnot.
Chesterman (1996) refers to this second, subsidiary look at translation as a comparison of tokens. The confusion has beset practitioners and theoreticians well nigh since the invention of writing and for a perfectly understandable reason.
The great difference between the translator and the original writer does not lie so much in that he, the translator, has to imitate, say, Shakespeare's form or strive for any kind of comparable effect (nobody forces him to), but in that he must re-verbalize Shakespeare's meaning: His Hamlet must be the same as Shakespeare's, and act the same way, and utter the same thoughts and give vent to the same feelings, and kill the same characters for the same reasons. Whatever the translator's poetical prowess, any deviations from that will be mistranslations (however justified on extra-translational grounds). Because translators have at least intuitively realized that, and despite the fact that most of us do not have access to the original, we all have read Crime and Punishment -and not just anybody's: Dostoevski's-if re-written by someone else.
Otherwise, how could we talk and argue about it?
XII. A new definition of equivalence and adequateness
In her most incisive article devoted to the concept of equivalence in translation studies,
Halverson has the following to say:
here are three main components to [a definition of equivalence]: a pair between which the relationship exists, a concept of likeness/sameness/similarity/equality, and a set of qualities...
The first, the specification of the entities between which the relationship pertains, is by no 15 means unproblematic. Establishment of such a relationship requires that the two entities involved be, in some way, comparable... The second component of the concept, the idea of likeness/sameness/similarity/equality, is also potentially problematic, though here the problem is of a slightly different nature. In fact, there are actually two specific aspects to the problem of sameness for the purposes of it: its nature and its degree... Sameness is a scalar concept... If two (or more) entities can be compared, and if sameness is defined as the presence of a specific quality, then for many qualities it may be shown that different entities possess those qualities in varying degrees. The third component of the concept of equivalence which can be, and has been, the focus of conceptual debate is the quality in terms of which the sameness is defined"
(1997:209-210).
I think that this is an excellent statement of the problem. And I also think that García Landa's model lays the ground for a satisfactory definition of translational equivalence:
Whatever the nature or degree of formal similarity between them, a reverbalization (in the case of translation, in another language) can be said to be equivalent to its respective original or to another reverbalization if it helps ensure ideational-meaning identity with similar processing effort (a necessary relevance-based addition that will make room for degrees of equivalence). Now, as we have seen, such meaning identity in and of itself is neither sufficient nor necessary for mediation to be adequate. My development of García Landa's model, I submit, allows us to develop the concept of translational equivalence into that of mediational adequateness: Equivalence becomes adequate only if it helps bring about the intended metarepresentations and qualitative side effects produced on the basis of speech comprehension (the contextual effects intended by the mediator, themselves subject to analysis and criticism): A reverbalization (in the case of interlingual mediation, in another language) is said to be adequate if it helps ensure metacommunicatively relevant ideational identity. The corollary is that a reverbalization may be more or less equivalent to an original one or than another reverbalization, but it can also be more or less adequate than either. This, What counts in each case as relevant identity depends solely on the metacommunicative purposes of the parties to the double speech act and is determined by the mediator (be it on his own, or in consultation with the parties, or saddled with a specific brief). Those who cannot see it fool themselves: obedience -even the blindest or dumbest, the most timorous or selfless-is but one of freedom's guises. The first thing to be weighted when it comes to judge a mediator or a specific act of mediation is, thus, how aptly relevant identity has been identified. Only then does it make sense to go about assessing the specific hermeneutic and heuristic moves. Since such relevant identity is never exactly the same for the different parties, the mediator, as a function of the metacommunicative purposes and consequences of his mediation and on the basis of his loyalty, decides what criteria to follow.
The most important corollary is that the mediator is interested in the relationship between "texts" and "utterances" only instrumentally. His actual concern is the relationship between sense as intended and as understood -i.e. what the interlocutors achieve by means of those "texts" and "utterances" as produced and understood by specific people in specific situations. The second most important corollary is that there is no necessary relationship between original and translated texts -which explains the exasperating conceptual and practical elusiveness of textual "equivalence". Such formal (semantic or other) equivalence, similarity, resemblance or coincidence between the formal attributes of original and translation is but one (if the most frequent and apparent) consequence of the mediator's quest for relevant identity between mental representations. This insight, I submit, throws new light on the dictum that a translator does not find equivalences, but creates them. Not quite: a translator finds textual ways of achieving relevant identity between meaning as intended and as understood; these ways may or may not coincide totally, partially or at all with the ways resorted to by the original speaker in his original text. When they do, then some kind of textual "equivalence" will certainly be found. Since very often they do not, it is not altogether productive to look for shared textual attributes as if texts were artefacts in a vacuum.
There is, therefore, no need to discard the concept or the term -all that is required is to be aware that it is an ancillary, incidental (if statistically rife) phenomenon that may be present or absent.
So the relationship between the mediator's text or utterance and the original may be extremely varied. We can call it, indeed, "coherence", as skopostheorists do, but I do not think it is clear enough. Such relationship is better defined, I think, as adequacy:
The text or utterance, or segment thereof, is adequate if and only if its comprehension by an interlocutor (whether intended or not) allows it to be relevantly identical to sense as originally intended. Since such identity is always ad hoc and a function of the parties' motivations, resistance, sensitivity and heuristic and hermeneutic ability (coupled to all situational factors and the systems gravitating upon them), even though the notion itself does not change, its practical realization is always different… a bit like happiness. Such adequacy, moreover, is a matter of degree: speech acts initiated by a mediator in a specific situation can be more adequate or less -the more adequate, the better his mediation.
An interlingual mediator's specific job, I insist, is no longer to understand sense (any genuinely interested interlocutor has such a task). Nor is it to reverbalize it in another language (for that, all is needed is a "translator"). Nor is it to achieve, as monolingual mediators (lawyers, ambassadors, amicable brokers), relevant identity between sense intended and understood. Of course, an interlingual mediator has to do all those things as well, but his specific job is to achieve such identity by initiating a new act of speech in a different language (or dialect).
The skopos of an act of mediation is, therefore, invariably the same: to determine and achieve the highest degree of relevant identity between intended and comprehended sense in a specific situation. Or, put in other terms, to have the interlocutor understand what, in the mediator's professional judgment and insofar as objectively possible and 18 deontologically acceptable, it is necessary, convenient or advisable that he understand in the way that it is necessary, convenient or advisable that he understand it.
In the practice of his profession, the interlingual mediator often stumbles against his lack of social power, due both to his clients' mistrust and to his own theoretical insecurity. These limitations -typical of a young profession that has not yet succeeded in establishing itself and lacks an underlying generally known, acknowledged, assimilated, aptly applied theory-impede his exercising his deontologically responsible freedom.
Our great battle is to overcome these two interdependent hurdles. It is too late for practitioners of my generation, I'm afraid: It is now up to our professional offspring to carry the day, but they too will find it impossible unless they are solidly equipped with an apt theoretical outlook.
This is why students must be taught to mediate and not simply to "translate" or to "interpret." This requires that they be endowed with the necessary theoretical wherewithal for competent practice, beginning with an analysis of the metacommunicative framework, the circumstances in which speech is produced and
understood, and what comprehension is all about -and not only of speech, but, above all, of the speaker's intentions from the standpoint of one's own interlocutors' interests and resistance. A thorough analysis of comprehension as metarepresentation is, I
submit indispensable. These elements must be in their young hands before anything else. A scientific theory of interlingual mediation cannot come as an afterthought. One cannot be taught first to swim and then to float.
XIII. A mediator's deontologically accountable freedom
A professional mediator (whether interlingual or not) is normally pulled by four centrifugal forces. For starters, nowhere is it written that a mediator ought necessarily to be the speaker's alter ego: He can also be the interlocutor's -or the commissioner's.
Being an alter ego means adopting the relevant motivations and intentions, speaking from the perspective of whoever means to mean or from that of whoever takes the trouble to understand -i.e. adopting as relevance criteria the metacommunicative interests of either or, in the case of interlingual mediation, as a general rule, a compromise between them. As we can see, this does not have so far any necessary consequences for the "fidelity" to the original utterance or text. Loyalty toward the speaker's motivations and intentions may well advice or demand departing from an original's meaning. And, obviously, so can loyalty to the interlocutor or the commissioner. But, above all, there is the profession itself, to which, as any other professional, a mediator owes supreme loyalty. The profession, through its specific deontology, represents the more general interests of society. In the vast or narrow scene in which he is called upon to act, there is no "x" telling the mediator where to stand once and for all. Between the speaker, the mediator's interlocutor, the interest (more often than not less than enlightened) of the commissioner who pays him, and the deontological norms of the profession there is, always, a space within which a mediator is to exercise his deontologically accountable freedom -even if he does not wish to exercise it or is afraid of exercising it. These four points (that can be conflated into three whenever the commissioner is either the speaker or the interlocutor) delimit such freedom. To transgress them is, by definition, to act unethically or, at best, incompetently.
It is the mediator who decides, each time, what counts as relevant identity between meaning as meant by the speaker and as understood by his interlocutor in the second speech act. It is true that sometimes -many fewer than so many believe-the commissioner requests or demands a certain kind of mediation, but it is always up to the mediator to accept or reject this imposition or, often, at least to make his own expert opinion prevail -not any more or less than a physician, a lawyer, an architect, or any other socially acknowledged professional.
A special paragraph must be devoted to the mediator who acts on his own initiative, as has traditionally been the case of the translation of literary, philosophic or religious texts. When a mediator translates because he damn well pleases, of course, he has total freedom to translate as he damn well pleases. Nobody forces or asks the translator to adapt or fail to adapt, to manipulate his text more or less 4 . But let it be clear that, in these instances, there is no real professional exercise or, therefore, professional deontology: The mediator's ethics is precisely that -ethics pure and simple. The very fact of translating may be considered heretical in itself (as was the case with Luther);
where is the heretic's deontology? In such cases, the mediator translates out of his own motivation and intentions, freely -sometimes even arbitrarily-choosing what counts as relevant identity of meaning. As always, of course, one thing is to choose the kind of relevant identity and a very different one to be able to achieve it.
XIV. The constitutive rule of interlingual mediation
The constitutive rule of interlingual mediation can reduced to the following dictum: Interlingual mediation can be, thus, at the same time more, less and something other than translation proper.
Translational equivalence, as, for that matter, any other kinds of correspondence, similarity or analogy between an original and its "translation" will be a consequence of the translator's work rather than its condition. And this is why the concept has been as what he has to "say" to me: I want to be told an "interesting" story that will produce a "pleasant" emotive effect. I want to be "thrilled," "moved," "amused," "entertained"
and, indeed, "educated;" and the cognitive and emotive effects will change with each "translate" an ad in a way that will actually help sell the product to the new audience).
Regardless of whether you may have a chance to consult with any of the actors (and not only the speaker), all these decisions will ultimately be yours and yours alone: You cannot help exercise your deontologically responsible freedom and be held accountable for it -exactly as any other true professional, whether physician, architect, engineer or lawyer.
This is, to many, a terrible revelation: Freedom is the most frightening thing. If the author, the original, the "words" you processed, are not divine, who is going to help you tell right from evil? No Great Inquisitor to enlighten poor Ivan Karamazov when it comes to interlingual mediation.
Because, if what counts in the end is not a relationship, similarity, analogy or equivalence between texts, but an empirically unverifiable correspondence between different mental representations achieved on the basis (and not simply as a result) of having processed such oral or written texts, "translational equivalence" is not the condition but the consequence of translational activity. If, by (presumably) willing to achieve cognitive effects W in order (presumably) to produce emotive effects X, the speaker has (presumably) intended to say Y and has actually managed to say Z, the basic circumstances, can or should I say that will help achieve optimum communication given the specific metacommunicative purposes in hand? In order to be "useful", then, a translation need not be faithful -or, rather, it not need be a "translation" at all. At every step, it behoves a mediator to decide whether to "translate" or to do something more, less or different. If it behoves him to have his interlocutor feel (something akin to) W by actually understanding (something akin to) X by meaning to say (something akin to) Y by saying (something akin to) Z, which in the target language will be Z 1 , then chances are that there will be myriad similarities between Z and Z 1 , but that is sheer statistical coincidence.
Since, more often than not, W, X, and Y need not -or cannot-be fully matched in the mind of the interlocutor, more often than not Z and Z 1 will evince disturbing, heretical, even scandalous discrepancies that will push some theoreticians into discarding altogether the notion of equivalence -disturbing, heretical and scandalous to the prudish adorers of false idols (in our case, those of the sanctity of he original and the fearful submission of the translator or interpreter to it). It is but the history of mankind and the development of knowledge and science. As a part of such development, this theory eagerly awaits those who will find its weaknesses, no matter how disturbed and scandalized I may be at the new heretics: As García Landa taught me, ideas do not belong to those who have had them in the first place, but to those who can put them to profitable (and, hopefully, ethical) use and, eventually, improve upon them. Your turn, my friend!
